Device Passport documentation
Device Passport lets a team give outside collaborators SSH access to the systems they need. The team sets the device checks for access: is the disk encrypted, is the OS patched, is the firewall on. Each collaborator reviews the request and decides whether to share the answers. A device that passes gets a short-lived SSH certificate from the team's certificate server (the CA).
Collaborators keep their own device. This is posture attestation. It is not EDR and it is not MDM, and no organization can change, lock or wipe a device through it.
The pieces
| Binary | Runs on | What it does |
|---|---|---|
dpassd |
the device, as root | Holds the device key, collects posture facts, answers challenges within the grants the owner gave, and keeps a hash-chained log of every question. |
dp |
the device, as the owner | dp setup, dp status, dp why, dp grants, dp log, dp canaries, dp keys. |
dp-ssh-agent |
the device, as the owner | An ssh-agent for stock ssh. It fetches a certificate just in time and has dpassd sign the login. |
dpass-ca |
your server, or ours | The SSH CA: SSO enrollment, posture checks, certificates, the admin console and admin commands. |
| Tray and desktop app | the device | Status in the menu bar, a plain fix when a check fails, and the owner's view of every organization and request. |
Where to go next
- New to the idea? Read How it works and the threat model. The threat model says plainly what a passing device proves and what it does not.
- Setting policy? Checks and assurance lists every check a CA can ask about.
- Want stronger keys? Hardware keys covers the Secure Enclave, YubiKey PIV and TPM attestation.
Status
Device Passport is in Phase 1, v0. It works end to end with stock ssh and sshd
on macOS and Linux. Wire formats may change before Phase 2. The quick starts assume you have access to the source repository or software provided by your team.