Device Passport

Checks and assurance

A check (a predicate in the protocol) is a named question with a yes, no or unknown answer. A CA can only ask about checks in the registry, and only the ones the device owner granted.

The registry

This table is built from registry/v0.json, the same file the agent and the CA read.

CheckWhat a yes meansParameterBest on macOSBest on Linux
disk_encryptedStartup disk is encrypted.agent-reportedagent-reported
os_patched_withinNo operating system updates are more than {n} days overdue.7d 14d 30d 60d 90dagent-reportedagent-reported
sip_enabledSystem Integrity Protection is on.hardware-backed–
secure_bootSecure boot was enforced at startup.hardware-backedhardware-backed
firewall_enabledFirewall blocks unexpected incoming connections.agent-reportedagent-reported
screen_lock_withinScreen requires a password within {n} minutes of inactivity.1m 5m 10m 15magent-reportedagent-reported
auto_updates_onSecurity updates are installed automatically.agent-reportedagent-reported
kexts_disallowedThird-party kernel extensions are not allowed or loaded.hardware-backed–
ssh_key_hardware_boundDevice key is hardware-protected and cannot be copied.hardware-backedhardware-backed
kernel_lockdownKernel lockdown blocks changes to the running kernel.–agent-reported
edr_presentRecognised security software is running.agent-reportedagent-reported
os_supportedOperating system still receives security updates.hardware-backedagent-reported
restarted_withinThe computer has restarted within the last {n} days.1d 7d 14d 30dagent-reportedhardware-backed
no_restart_pendingNo installed update is waiting for a restart to take effect.agent-reportedagent-reported
no_known_bad_binariesNo program measured since the last restart matches a known malicious file hash.–hardware-backed
edr_assessment_at_leastYour endpoint security tool rates this device at least {n}.medium highagent-relayedagent-relayed

Parameters come from fixed buckets, so a CA cannot probe for an exact value. For example, os_patched_within accepts 7d, 14d, 30d, 60d or 90d.

Using checks in policy

Each environment lists the checks it requires:

[[environment]]
name = "staging"
principals = ["alice", "bob"]
require = ["disk_encrypted", "firewall_enabled"]

[[environment]]
name = "production"
principals = ["alice"]
require = ["disk_encrypted", "os_patched_within:14d", "firewall_enabled",
           "screen_lock_within:5m"]

Assurance levels

Every answer carries an assurance level. The CA works the level out for itself and never trusts the label a device writes.

Level Meaning
agent-reported The Device Passport agent on this enrolled device says so. Fresh, bound to this CA, and signed by the device key. Root on the device could lie.
agent-relayed The agent passes on a verdict that a third party signed, such as an EDR tool's assessment.
hardware-backed The answer rests on evidence signed by hardware (a TPM, or Apple's attestation) and checked by an evidence issuer. This is the job of the attestation service.

The table's last two columns show the best level each check can reach on each platform. A dash means the check does not apply there.

Agent-reported checks catch honest mistakes and unenrolled machines. They do not catch a device owner with root who lies. The threat model covers this in full, and you should read it before you rely on a check for anything important.