Hardware keys
By default a certificate is issued to the device key, which is a software key in v0. An environment can require that the certificate go to a key held in hardware, so it cannot be copied off the machine.
Secure Enclave on macOS
The Device Passport macOS app holds a signing key in the Secure Enclave. The signer uses Touch ID for each signature. Apple App Attest verifies the signer app’s own key. The signer app binds that proof to the separate Secure Enclave signing key. This requires a supported Mac and signed app, plus a CA configured to accept App Attest.
dp-ssh-agent reaches the key through the app's signing bridge, a local
Unix socket. See App Attest key verification.
dp ssh setup https://ssh-ca.example.com --principal alice \
--hosts '*.prod.example.com' --signing-key attested
YubiKey PIV
A YubiKey 5 can hold the key in a PIV slot. The CA verifies Yubico's attestation chain, which proves the key was generated on the token and states its PIN and touch policy. Follow YubiKey PIV login.
Requiring a hardware key
Add a key table to the environment:
[[environment]]
name = "production"
principals = ["alice", "bob"]
require = ["disk_encrypted", "os_patched_within:14d"]
key = { sources = ["app-attest", "yubikey-piv"], presence = "every" }
presence = "every" means a touch or Touch ID for each login. The
certificate records the key’s source and verified policy in extensions for audit. The full reference is in
Operating the CA.
TPM on Linux
On Linux, the hardware story is attestation: a TPM 2.0 quote over the boot state and a certification of the device's key, checked by the attestation service design. With an IMA policy, the verifier can check measured executables against configured known-bad feeds. See Linux IMA policy.